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Case No. 20090546-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Benson Manwaring, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
la. Did Defendant voluntarily consent to take a portable breath test (PBT), 
where the trial court's uncontested factual findings not only show that Defendant 
affirmatively responded to a request from an officer, but also that the officer's 
request was unaccompanied by any show of force, threat, or act of coercion? 
lb. Was the officer entitled to consider the results of the PBT as part of his 
probable cause determination, where no Utah authority prohibited such use? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, this Court reviews the court's factual findings for clear error and its legal 
conclusions for correctness. State v. Dunkel, 2006 UT App 339, ^ 6,143 P.3d 290. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it excluded expert testimony 
on an irrelevant issue? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, U10,137 P.3d 726. 
Similarly, A trial court has "broad discretion to determine whether proffered 
evidence is relevant, and we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial 
court has abused its discretion." State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 17, 999 P.2d 7 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
3. Did the trial court correctly reject Defendant's vagueness challenge to the 
DUI statute, where uncontested evidence shows that Defendant engaged in conduct 
that was clearly prohibited by the statute? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, this 
Court "presume[s] that the statute is constitutional. The challenger bears the burden 
of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of a statute." State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 
382, f^ 18, — P.3d —. "Furthermore, unconstitutionality of a statute must be shown 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts review constitutional challenges for 
correctness/' Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a~502 (Supp. 2009)1 
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within 
this state if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(c) has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of operation or actual physical control. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 26, 2005, Defendant was charged with one count of DUI. R. 1-2. 
Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the results of the field sobriety 
test and the blood alcohol tests that had been taken at the time of his arrest. R. 30-
Shortly after this incident, an amended version of the statute took effect 
which removed an additional variant of DUI that had been set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6a-502(d). That amendment did not alter the provisions at issue 
here. Except where necessary, the State cites to the current version of the statute. 
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38. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. R. 
69, 97-114; 456:1404. 
Defendant provided notice prior to trial that he intended to call an expert to 
testify regarding blood alcohol absorption rates. R. 134. The trial court initially 
approved the expert, R. 201, but subsequently reconsidered and concluded that the 
proposed testimony would be irrelevant to the variant of DUI at issue here. R. R. 
457: 98-99. 
Defendant was tried on September 29, 2008. R. 281-82. Following 
deliberations, the jury convicted Defendant. R. 356-58. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
On June 19, 2005, Defendant was on his motorcycle with his fiancee, 
preparing to turn left at a light, when an oncoming car veered out of its lane and 
struck him. R. 456: 6. The accident occurred at approximately 9:25 pm. R. 458:16. 
2In his brief, Defendant relies on his testimony from the suppression hearing 
about the alcohol testing at issue. Aplt. Br. 3-4,19. At the conclusion of that hearing, 
however, the trial court concluded that Defendant's account was not reliable, and 
instead "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts." R. 106. 
This Court ordinarily "'recite[s] the facts in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings.'" State v. Bunting, 2002 UT App 195, f 2, 51 P.3d 37 (citation 
omitted). This is particularly the case where, as here, the defendant fails to directly 
challenge those findings in his brief. State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, TJ10 n.4, 74 
P.3d 1176. As such, the State relies on the findings "as drafted by the [trial] court." 
Id. For convenience, the trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum A to this brief. 
4 
Officer Kreston Bascom arrived on scene a short time later to investigate the 
accident. R. 458: 18. As part of his investigation, Officer Bascom spoke with 
Defendant, who was in an ambulance being treated for his injuries. R. 113; 456: 34. 
Officer Bascom "smelled alcohol on the defendant's breath" and suspected that 
Defendant might have been driving while intoxicated. R. 112. Officer Bascom 
radioed dispatch and requested two backups: one to assist with traffic control, and 
one to investigate Defendant for DUI. R. 458: 34. 
Officer Joshua Jennings subsequently arrived on the scene to "conduct the 
DUI portion of the investigation/' R. I l l ; 456: 61. Officer Bascom told Officer 
Jennings that he had smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath and "suspected a DUI/7 
R. 112. Officer Jennings then spoke with Defendant in the ambulance. R. 112. 
Defendant told him that he thought that his ankle was broken, and Officer Jennings 
"observed cuts and scrapes all over the defendant's legs and road rash on his 
hands." R. 111-12. But Defendant "affirmatively asserted that he did not have any 
head injuries," and "Officer Jennings testified that the paramedics did not believe 
that the defendant had sustained any head injury and did not see any signs of a 
head injury." R. 111-12. Defendant also did not appear to be in shock. R. 458: 67. 
While speaking with Defendant, Officer Jennings "noted a strong odor of 
alcohol emanating from" Defendant's breath. R. I l l ; 455: 6; 456: 62. At the 
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conclusion of their conversation, Officer Jennings left the ambulance and examined 
the scene of the accident. R. 111. He saw Defendant's motorcycle on the ground 
with damage to its front tire. R. 111. "He further observed three 24-ounce 
unopened cans of beer on the ground close to the motorcycle." R. 111. 
Officer Jennings did not have a portable breath test (PBT) or DUI citation 
form with him, so he did not request that Defendant take the PBT or perform any 
field sobriety tests at that time. R. 110-11; 456: 63-64. Instead, while the ambulance 
transported Defendant to the hospital, Officer Jennings drove to the police station, 
retrieved the necessary items, and met Defendant in the emergency room. R. 110-11; 
456: 63-64. 
Officer Jennings arrived at the hospital at 10:35 pm and then asked Defendant 
"if he would perform some sobriety tests." R. 108,110. Defendant "indicated that 
he would perform the tests." R. 110. Due to Defendant's leg and ankle injuries, 
Officer Jennings did not have him perform the walk-and-turn test or the one-leg-
stand test. R. 110. Instead, Officer Jennings only had him perform the horizontal-
gaze nystagmus test (HGN). R. 110. 
Officer Jennings later testified regarding the nature of the HGN. He explained 
that when a person is impaired, the alcohol "slows down their physical reaction to 
track an object" with their eyes. R. 458: 39. As a result, an observer is able to "see 
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what some would describe as bouncing in the eyes as it tries to catch up or predict 
where that object is going/' R. 459: 39. According to Officer Jennings7 training, a 
failed HGN alone is ordinarily sufficient to show that a suspect's blood alcohol 
concentration is above the legal limit. R. 455: 20. When Officer Jennings had 
Defendant perform the HGN, he "observed nystagmus in both eyes at the 
maximum deviation/' R. 110. Officer Jennings accordingly believed that Defendant 
"was impaired above the per se level of .08 blood-alcohol content." R. 110. 
"Officer Jennings next asked the defendant to take a PBT." R. 109. Though 
PBT's have "changed in size now over the years," the version in use at the time of 
this incident was "a small box" that had a straw "clipped onto the top." R. 458: 45. 
Prior to beginning the test, an officer would "press a button" to "calibrate[ ] the 
machine," doing an "internal test to make sure it's functioning properly." R. 458:45. 
At that point, the suspect would "blow into one end of the straw so that the machine 
can take its sample . . . to determine the presence of alcohol." R. 458: 45. The PBT 
would then give an "estimated" amount of the suspect's blood alcohol 
concentration. R. 456: 76. 
Although Officer Jennings had been instructed to record the PBT's precise 
measurement in his notes, he had also been instructed to not rely on it for an exact 
blood alcohol calculation. R. 455:16. Instead, he simply used the PBT to confirm 
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"the presence of alcohol" in the suspect's blood. R. 455:16. He therefore regarded 
the PBT as a "supplement" to the standard field sobriety tests. R. 458: 33. 
When Officer Jennings asked Defendant to take the PBT, he told him "that he 
didn't have to take the test." R. 455:19. Officer Jennings also made no effort to 
compel Defendant to take the test through non-verbal means. Officer Jennings never 
locked any doors, never drew his weapon, and never took out his handcuffs. R. 456: 
69. Officer Jennings never threatened Defendant with arrest or incarceration if 
Defendant refused to submit to the PBT. R. 108; 456: 63. And Officer Jennings 
conducted the interview in a public place. Specifically, the ER was "under 
construction at that time," so Defendant was "being treated by the emergency room 
staff" in a "curtain style room" throughout the interview R. 456: 81; 458: 58. 
Defendant's fiancee was "in close proximity" as well. R. 458: 46. 
Defendant "did not object" to taking the test, and was "willing to take" it. R. 
109; 455: 22. Officer Jennings later said that Defendant was "cooperative" during 
the process. R. 456: 70. 
After Defendant completed the test, the PBT estimated Defendant's blood 
alcohol concentration as .107. R. 455: 8. Given the smell of alcohol on Defendant's 
breath, the three 24-ounce beer cans found around Defendant's motorcycle, and the 
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failed HGN test, Officer Jennings later testified that he would have arrested 
Defendant for DUI even if the PBT had "come back below .08." R. 456: 84. 
Officer Jennings then "placed the defendant under arrest for driving under 
the influence of alcohol." R. 109. Only five minutes had elapsed from the time that 
Officer Jennings arrived at the hospital to the time that he arrested Defendant. R. 
108. Defendant took the HGN and the PBT in the intervening five minutes. R. 108. 
After arresting Defendant, Officer Jennings "read the DUI admonition 
pursuant" to Utah's implied consent law and asked Defendant "if he would submit 
to a [blood test] to determine the alcohol content level of his blood." R. 109. 
Defendant said "that's okay" and "agreed to submit" to the test. R. 109; 458: 47. 
A forensic nurse arrived performed the blood draw at 11:55 p.m. R. 200; 458: 
78. Prior to performing the blood draw, the nurse wiped Defendant down with a 
Betadine swab, rather than ethanol, so as to avoid introducing any alcohol-based 
product into Defendant's blood. R. 458: 90. This blood sample was subsequently 
tested by the state forensic toxicology lab. R. 458: 136. As part of that testing 
process, the lab ran two different blood samples twice. R. 458: 143. The four test 
results came back at .105, .105, .106, and .107. R. 458:143. Pursuant to policy, the lab 
rounded down from the lowest score, thereby concluding that Defendant's B AC had 
been .10 at the time of the test. R. 458:144. 
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Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of DUI. R. 1-2. The 
State initially alleged that Defendant had committed DUI under one of three 
different variants set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a)-(c) (Supp. 
2005). But the State subsequently agreed to only proceed under Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a), which makes it illegal for a person to drive a vehicle 
with "sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at 
the time of the test" R. 200, 221-23 (emphasis added). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress prior to trial. R. 30-38. Defendant 
claimed had unconstitutionally "required" him to take the PBT, and he then argued 
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine precluded use of all resulting evidence — 
including the PBT result and the result of the blood draw. R. 30-38. The trial court 
subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on this motion. R. 69; 456:1-104. At that 
hearing, defense counsel specifically waived any claim that Defendant was in 
custody when Officer Jennings spoke with him in the ambulance or in the hospital. 
R. 456:94-96. Instead, counsel acknowledged that his motion was based only on his 
claim that the officers had "require[d]" Defendant to take the PBT. R. 456: 94-96. 
The trial court subsequently issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
rejecting Defendant's claim. R. 97-114. 
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Prior to trial, Defendant also provided notice that he intended to call Gary 
Potter as an expert witness. R. 134. According to the attached curriculum vitae, 
Potter was a licensed private detective who had previously been a sheriffs deputy. 
R. 126-32. Defendant explained that he intended to have Potter testify regarding 
two issues. First, he intended to have Potter testify about "the procedures 
established concerning blood draws and other variables/' R. 159. According to 
Defendant, this would allow him to argue that "prior to taking the blood test, [he] 
was subjected to treatment for injuries which could have involved cleaning of his 
wounds with alcohol," thereby resulting in the elevated blood alcohol content as 
measured by the blood draw. R. 163. Second, he intended to have Potter testify 
about blood alcohol absorption rates. R. 163. According to Defendant, this 
testimony would show that blood alcohol rates sometimes continue rising after a 
suspect has stopped driving a vehicle, thus indicating that the suspect was not 
above the legal limit while actually operating the vehicle. R. 134,161. 
The State objected on two grounds. First, the State argued that Potter was not 
qualified to offer the proposed testimony; and second, the State argued that 
Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident was irrelevant, 
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given that he was only charged with violating Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-
502(l)(a). R. 138-41.3 
In response, Defendant filed a motion arguing that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) was 
unconstitutionally vague. R. 158-65,176-180. Following a hearing, however, the 
trial court denied Defendant's vagueness challenge. R. 200-01. The court also ruled 
that while Potter was not qualified to testify regarding "defendant's medical 
records" or "where his blood should have been drawn," he would be allowed to 
testify regarding the "Widmark formula," which is used to determine blood alcohol 
absorption rates. R. 225-26. 
Defendant's trial began on September 29, 2008. R. 281-82. Prior to the 
beginning of the trial, the court informed the parties that it had reconsidered its 
earlier ruling regarding Potter's proposed testimony. R. 457: 94. The court 
explained that since the State was only relying on § 41-6a-502(l)(a), "any testimony 
that would be proffered or requested that would go to what [Defendant's] blood 
alcohol or breath alcohol concentration would have been at the time of the accident" 
would be "irrelevant." R. 457: 98-99. As such, the court concluded that there was 
3
 As noted above, Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) only focuses on 
whether the person's blood alcohol concentration is ".08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test." 
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no basis to introduce any expert testimony regarding the application of the 
Widmark formula to this case. R. 457: 94-98. 
During the ensuing trial, the State explained to the jury that the sole basis for 
the charge was the blood draw that had occurred after Defendant's arrest. R. 458:5-
8. The State did not rely on the PBT as support for its claim, but instead relied on 
testimony from its experts showing that Defendant's blood alcohol concentration 
was 10 at the time of the test. R. 458: 143-44; 72-77. Following deliberations, the 
jury convicted Defendant. R. 356-58. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Defendant claims that he was unconstitutionally coerced to take the 
PBT. But the trial court's uncontested factual findings show that Officer Jennings 
asked Defendant to take the test while in a publicly accessible room with other 
people present, that Officer Jennings' request was not accompanied by any show of 
force or coercive act, and that Defendant voluntarily agreed to take the test. 
Defendant also claims that Officer Jennings could not even request that he 
take the PBT without probable cause that Defendant was driving while intoxicated. 
But this is inconsistent with prior Utah decisions that have allowed officers to 
request consent for such a test prior to arrest. In any event, the trial court below also 
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correctly noted that a PBT is the functional equivalent of a field sobriety test, which 
can requested with reasonable suspicion alone. 
Finally, Defendant claims that PBT's are inherently reliable and should not be 
considered in determining probable cause for arrest. But Defendant has not 
identified which PBT was actually used in this case, let alone pointed to any 
problem with this particular device. As such, his claim is inadequately briefed. In 
any event, the PBT at issue here produced a blood alcohol calculation that was 
ultimately consistent with the results reached by testing Defendant's blood sample. 
Thus, if anything, this record demonstrates that PBT's are reliable. 
Issue II: Defendant claims that the trial court violated his due process rights 
by excluding his proposed expert testimony on certain medical issues, as well as on 
his likely blood alcohol concentration at the time he was driving his motorcycle. 
But Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion that his expert 
was not qualified to testify regarding the medical issues. Thus, that claim is not 
properly before this Court. And although Defendant claims that his expert should 
have also been permitted to testify regarding blood alcohol absorption rates, the 
State limited the prosecution in this case to a sub-provision of the DUI statute that 
was not based on Defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time he was 
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driving. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the proposed testimony was 
irrelevant to this particular prosecution. 
Issue III: Finally, Defendant claims that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-
502(1)(a) is vague. Defendant has not only failed to properly brief this claim, but he 
has also failed to show that he has standing to raise it. In any event, the plain 
language of this statute prohibits a person from consuming sufficient alcohol to 
become intoxicated and then driving. A person of reasonable intelligence would 
understand its prohibitions, and Defendant's vagueness challenge therefore fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN DENIED 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant raises two different claims regarding the PBT. Aplt. Br. 16-25. 
Defendant first argues that he was coerced into taking the PBT; and as a result, 
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his suppression 
motion. Aplt. Br. 16-19. Second, Defendant argues that even if the PBT was 
properly administered, its result could not be used as part of the probable cause 
determination or as substantive evidence of his guilt. Aplt. Br. 19-22. These 
arguments should both be rejected. 
15 
A. Officer Jennings did not coerce Defendant into taking the PBT. 
"In determining whether voluntary consent was given for a warrantless 
search, we have a two-prong analysis. A consent is valid only if (1) the consent was 
given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a] 
prior illegality/' State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 27, - Adv. Rep. --. In this case, the 
evidence clearly showed that both prongs of this analysis were satisfied. 
1. Defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT. 
"For a defendant to voluntarily consent to a search the defendant must (A) 
actually consent to the search and (B) consent must be voluntary." Id. The supreme 
court has cautioned against "conflating" these two separate aspects of this analysis. 
Id. at Tf 29. Both are satisfied here. 
Actual consent: A trial court's conclusion that a suspect actually consented to 
a search "is a factual finding, and it is based on the totality of the circumstances." Id. 
at ^ 30. Given the trial court's "unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses 
and weigh the evidence,... an appellate court should defer to the factual findings of 
the trial court unless the findings are clearly erroneous." Id. (quotations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court found that "Officer Jennings . . . asked the 
defendant to take a PBT. The defendant did not object and the officer administered 
the test." R. 109. The court additionally found that Defendant had also "agreed to 
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take the PBT," and it accordingly concluded "that the defendant voluntarily 
consented to the administration of the PBT/7 R. 100. 
Although Defendant now argues that he was coerced into taking this test, he 
has not directly challenged the trial court's factual findings to the contrary. He has 
not marshaled the evidence as required by rule 24(a)(9), and he has not argued that 
the court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. Given these marshaling failures, 
this Court should assume that the evidence supports the court's finding that he 
voluntarily consented to the administration of the PBT. See State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 
113,108 P.3d 710.4 
Voluntariness: The trial court also determined that Defendant's consent was 
voluntarily given. R. 100-01. "The voluntariness of consent to a search is a legal 
conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, % 36 (quotations 
and citation omitted). This analysis "requires careful scrutiny of the details of the 
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. And the totality of the 
circumstances must show consent was given without duress or coercion." Id. at 
4
 In any event, Officer Jennings testified that although he told Defendant 
"that he didn't have to take the test," Defendant was nevertheless "willing to take" 
it. R. 455:19, 22; see also R. 456: 70-71. Officer Jennings also testified that Defendant 
was "cooperative" during this process. R. 456: 70-71. Given this, the court's finding 
was not clearly erroneous. 
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Tf 37. In examining such claims, courts commonly look to "five factors that may 
show a lack of duress or coercion: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere 
request to search; (4) cooperation by the [suspect]; and (5) the absence of deception 
or trickery on the part of the officer/7 Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Even if 
one factor "tends to weigh against voluntariness, under the totality of the 
circumstances, other factors... coupled with Defendant's cooperation/' can lead to 
a conclusion that "Defendant's consent was voluntary and not coerced." State v. 
Humphrey, 2006 UT App 221,124,138 P.3d 590. 
In reviewing such claims, the trial court's application of the legal standard is 
ultimately a legal question, but its underlying factual findings are accepted by the 
appellate court unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 23. As 
noted above, Defendant has not properly challenged any of the trial court's findings 
on this issue. As such, this Court should assume that those findings are supported 
by the evidence. Green, 2005 UT 9,113. 
Viewed under this standard, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that Defendant's consent was not coerced. 
First, this test was not the result of any "claim of authority." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, 
<JI 37. To the contrary, the trial court specifically found that Officer Jennings "never 
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told the defendant that he would arrest him if the defendant didn't submit to the 
PBT test." R. 110. And Officer Jennings similarly testified that he did not "claim 
any authority to do the portable breath test without [Defendant's] consent" R. 456: 
70-71. 
Second, this test was not the result of an "exhibition of force." Tripp, 2010 UT 
9, f 37. The trial court specifically "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts 
surrounding the administration of the HGN and the PBT." R. 106. Officer Jennings 
testified that he did not have any other officer with him, and that he did not ever 
lock any doors, draw his weapon, or take out his handcuffs. R. 456; 69. Moreover, 
Officer Jennings did not attempt to pressure Defendant by conducting the interview 
in an isolated setting. Instead, he spoke with Defendant while Defendant was 
"being treated by the emergency room staff" in a "curtain style room," with his 
fiancee "in close proximity" the entire time. R. 456: 81; 458: 46, 58. 
Third, this test resulted from a "mere request." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^  37. The trial 
court found that Officer Jennings had "simply asked the defendant if he could 
administer the HGN and the portable breath test." R. 100. And Officer Jennings 
testified that he told Defendant "that he didn't have to take the test." R. 455: 19. 
Defendant "did not object," but was instead "willing to take" it. R. 109; 455: 22. 
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Fourth, this test was coupled with "cooperation from [Defendant]." Tripp, 
2010 UT 9, Tf 37. The trial court found that Defendant "fully cooperated and agreed 
to take the PBT." R. 100. And Officer Jennings similarly testified that Defendant 
was "cooperative" when asked to blow into the machine. R. 456: 70. 
Fifth, Defendant has not pointed to any instance in which Officer Jennings 
used "deception or trickery" to secure his compliance. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, If 37. And 
the trial court specifically found that there "is nothing in the evidence presented" 
indicating that deception or trickery was used. R. 1000, See also R. 456: 63. 
In spite of this, Defendant now claims that he was "required" to take the test. 
Aplt. Br. 4, 19. In support, Defendant points to his own testimony from the 
suppression hearing, during which he said that he was told that he would be 
arrested and taken to jail if he did not take the PBT. Aplt. Br. 4,19. 
But Officer Jennings flatly denied this in both the preliminary hearing and the 
suppression hearing. R. 455: 18; 456: 62, 70. At the suppression hearing, for 
example, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: Did -was there any more conversation about blowing into the 
portable breath test? 
Officer Jennings: Not that I could remember. 
Q: Did he say anything like, 'If I don't do it, will you arrest me?" 
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Officer Jennings; I remember him asking me if he would go to jail; and 
I told him no. 
Q: Okay. Did you claim any authority to do the portable breath test 
without his consent? 
Officer Jennings: No. 
R. 456: 70-71. 
The trial court "adopt[ed] the officers' version of the facts surrounding the 
administration of . . . the PBT, finding their testimony to be more reliable." R. 106. 
And the trial court specifically found that "Officer Jennings never told the defendant 
that he was going to jail, never brought the issue up, and testified that he had no 
intention of taking the defendant to jail, due to the extent of the defendant's 
injuries." R. 108. 
In short, there was nothing coercive about Defendant's consent. Officer 
Jennings approached Defendant in a public place with other people around and 
asked him if he would take the test, and Officer Jennings did so without threat or 
show of force. Defendant then willingly agreed to take the test. As such, the trial 
court correctly concluded that Defendant voluntarily consented to take this test. 
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2, Defendant's consent was not the product of any police 
illegality. 
As noted above, Defendant can also prevail if he shows that the search "was 
. . . obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality/' Tripp, 2010 UT 9, % 27. In 
this case, Defendant argues that Officer Jennings could not even request that he take 
a PBT without probable cause. Aplt. Br. 19-20. This argument should be rejected. 
There is no Utah decision specifically addressing the standard for requesting a 
PBT. And Defendant is correct that some states — either by statute or case law — do 
require officers to have probable cause of DUI before even requesting a PBT. See, 
e.g., People v. Chowdhury, 775 N.W.2d 845,850-54 (Mich. App. 2009); State v. Begicevic, 
678 N.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Wis. App. 2004). 
But the clear majority of courts have rejected that position. A number have 
done so explicitly, expressly holding that an officer can request a PBT based on 
reasonable suspicion alone. See State v. WJtitney, 889 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind. App. 
2008); State v. Vonderharr, 733 N.W.2d 847,854 (Minn. App. 2007); State v. Huettl, 379 
N.W.2d 298,305 (S.D. 1985); State v. McGuigan, 965 A.2d 511,516-17 (Vt. 2008). And 
a number of courts have done so implicitly, holding that an officer can use a PBT to 
develop probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587,590-91 (8th 
Cir. 1999); People v. Kavanaugh, 840 N.E.2d 807, 812 (111. App. 2005); State v. Gray, 18 
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P.3d 962, 966 (Kan. 2001); State v. Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo.App. 2007); 
People v. Thomas, 121 A.D.2d 73, 76-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Commonwealth v. 
Marshall 824 A.2d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly accepted this position as well. As 
noted by Defendant in his brief, a request for a breath test is ordinarily governed by 
the Utah's implied consent law, which is set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-
520 (West 2004). In State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1968), however, the 
supreme court determined that implied consent only arises after a person has been 
arrested. But prior to arrest—i.e. prior to the development of probable cause — , 
officers may administer a breath test if they obtain "actual consent" from the 
suspect. Id.; accord In re R.L.L, 771 P.2d 1068,1069-70 (Utah 1989). Although not 
expressly stated, it stands to reason that an officer must be allowed to request 
consent in order to obtain it. Thus, Cruz and In re R.L.L clearly suggest that an 
officer can request a PBT without probable cause. 
This conclusion is also supported by the nature of the test itself. Other courts 
that have examined such claims have differentiated between PBT's and standard 
breathalyzers. Unlike a breathalyzer, a PBT is not ordinarily used as substantive 
proof of a suspect's specific blood alcohol concentration. Rather, a PBT is ordinarily 
used as a "screening device" to "provide[ ] . . . a threshold determination whether a 
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person has consumed alcohol/7 Whitney, 889 N.E.2d at 827,828. In this manner, a 
PBT performs the same function as a field sobriety test. See, e.g., Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 
at 591; Gray, 18 P.3d at 966; McGuigan, 965 A.2d at 517. As such, courts have seen 
"no difference in the officer's use of the [PBT] than in the use of manual dexterity 
tests such as the finger-to-nose test, to determine intoxication/' Whitney, 889 N.E.2d 
at 828 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Officer Jennings drew a similar comparison below, referring to the PBT as "a 
sobriety test" that simply confirms "the presence of alcohol" in a suspect's blood. R. 
455:16; 456: 79. And in its ruling, the trial court likewise stated that she "views the 
PBT as nothing more than a field sobriety test, akin to the HGN, the one-leg stand, 
and the walk-and-turn tests." R. 105. 
In Utah, an officer can request that a suspect perform a field sobriety test as 
long as there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect was driving while intoxicated. 
See, e.g., State v. Rogue, 2007 UT App 86, U 7,157 P.3d 826. Thus, Officer Jennings 
needed nothing more than reasonable suspicion to request this test. 
But even if probable cause was required, there was no error in this case 
because, as the trial court ruled, Officer Jennings already had probable cause when 
he requested that Defendant take the PBT. Probable cause exists when "a man of 
reasonable caution" would believe "that an offense has been or is being committed." 
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State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, % 34,164 P.3d 397 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"Probable cause is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and deals with 
probabilities and 'certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior' 
formulated by law enforcement officers." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, f 48 (quoting Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). Moreover, the "validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer . . . guided by his experience and training. " State v. Despain, 
2007 UT App 367, % 9,173 P.3d 213 (quotations and citation omitted). 
In this case, Officer Jennings and Officer Bascom both smelled a "strong odor 
of alcohol" on Defendant's breath when talking to him in the ambulance. R. 111-12; 
456: 62. Officer Jennings also found three unopened 24-ounce cans of beer next to 
Defendant's motorcycle after the accident. R. 111. And finally, when Defendant 
performed the HGN, Officer Jennings "observed nystagmus in both eyes at the 
maximum deviation/' R. 110, which was significant because Officer Jennings' 
training had shown that a failed HGN alone shows that a suspect's blood alcohol 
concentration was above the legal limit. R. 455: 20. Given these indicators, Officer 
Jennings reasonably believed that Defendant had been driving his motorcycle while 
intoxicated even before requesting the PBT. 
* * * * * 
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In short, the trial court's findings demonstrate that Defendant voluntarily 
consented to the take the PBT, and that this test was not the product of any police 
illegality. As a result, the PBT was properly administered, and the trial court 
correctly concluded that the subsequent evidence — including the blood draw—was 
admissible. 
B. The results of the PBT were admissible as part of the probable 
cause determination. 
In addition to challenging Officer Jennings' basis for requesting the PBT, 
Defendant also argues that the test itself is inherently unreliable. Aplt. Br. 21-22. As 
a result, Defendant argues that PBT's should not be considered in determining 
probable cause. Aplt. Br. 21-22. This argument should be rejected for three reasons. 
First, the argument is inadequately briefed. Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, an appellant's brief must "contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." As Utah courts have 
frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
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party may dump the burden of argument and research/' State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 
120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72. 
In this case, Defendant makes a number of broad claims about the reliability 
of PBT's. Aplt. Br. 21-23. But as the trial court noted, he has failed to identify which 
device was actually used in his test, let alone the supposed defects in that device's 
testing capabilities. This failure is significant given the large number of testing 
machines that qualify as PBT's. At the time of this incident, the NHTSA had 
approved 129 different devices for measuring breath alcohol, 121 of which could be 
used in a "mobile" fashion such as this case. 72 Fed. Reg. 71480-02 (Dec. 17, 2007) 
(Addendum B).5 
The variety of devices was further confirmed by the testimony below. When 
asked about the PBT that was used here, Officer Jennings specifically noted that the 
device he used with Defendant had since been replaced by a different model. R. 
458: 44-45. 
Thus, while Defendant has made a number of general claims about the 
alleged unreliability of PBTs, he has made no claim about the reliability of the 
particular device that was used here. As a result, the trial court properly refused to 
5
 The NHTSA has since added four additional devices to that list. See 75 Fed. 
Reg. 11624-01 (March 11, 2010). 
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consider this claim on its merits. R. 105-06. This Court should likewise disregard 
his claim as inadequately briefed. 
Second, a number of courts have examined similar claims and concluded that 
while PBT's are not as accurate as stationary breathalyzers, they may be used for 
purposes of determining probable cause. See, e.g., Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d at 590-91; 
Boyd v. City of Montgomery, 472 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Attix v. 
Voshell, 579 A.2d 1125,1129 (Del.Super.Ct. 1989); Kavanaugh, 840 N.E.2d at 812; Gray, 
18 P.3d at 966; State v. Strizich, 952 P.2d 1365,1371 (Mont. 1997); State v. Klingelhoefer, 
382 N.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Neb. 1986); Morgenroth, 227 S.W.3d at 522; Thomas, 121 
A.D.2d at 77; Marshall, 824 A.2d at 328; Jones v. Town of Marion, 508 S.E.2d 921, 923 
(Va.App. 1999). 
Some states admittedly hold to the contrary, preventing the prosecution from 
relying on a PBT, even for probable cause. See, e.g., Harmon v. State, 809 A.2d 696, 
703-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Thompson v. State Dept. of Licensing, 982 P.2d 601, 
786 n.l (Wash. 1999). But such results are ordinarily dictated by a specific state 
statute. See Harmon, 809 A.2d at 703-05; State v. Smith, 922 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. 
1996). There is no such statute in Utah, however, and in the absence of any 
testimony regarding the reliability of the particular device in use here, this Court 
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should decline Defendant's invitation to issue a blanket ruling forbidding the use of 
all such devices in all probable cause determinations. 
Third, the evidence in this case refutes Defendant's claim. Specifically, the 
PBT that Defendant took estimated his blood alcohol as .107. R. 455: 8. When 
Defendant's blood was tested by the state forensic lab, the four test results came 
back at .105, .105, .106, and .107. R. 458:143. Thus, Defendant is asking this Court 
to conclude that PBT's are inherently unreliable, even though the PBT that was used 
here proved to be as reliable as a blood analysis that was done at the State forensic 
lab. Given this, there is no factual basis on this record with which to invalidate the 
results of these tests. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT PREVENTED 
DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
BLOOD ALCOHOL ABSORPTION RATES 
Under the DUI statute in effect at the time of this prosecution, a person could 
be prosecuted for DUI under one of the three subsections set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) to (c). As noted above, however, the State limited its 
prosecution in this case to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a). R. 200, 221-23. 
Under that provision, a "person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: (a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body 
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that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test." 
Prior to trial, Defendant provided notice of his intent to call Gary Potter as an 
expert on (1) "the procedures established concerning blood draws and other 
variables," and (2) blood alcohol absorption rates. R. R. 159,163. The trial court 
ultimately prevented Potter from testifying regarding either aspect of this case. R. 
225-26; 457:98-99. Defendant now argues that these rulings violated his due process 
rights by preventing him from presenting a valid defense. Aplt. Br. 25-33. Both 
arguments should be rejected. 
First, the trial court did not err when it ruled that Potter could not testify 
about "the procedures established concerning blood draws and other variables." R. 
159. Although Defendant argues that this testimony could have shown that his 
blood alcohol level was actually the result of his post-accident medical treatment, 
Aplt. Br. 29, the trial court concluded that Potter was not qualified to testify 
regarding any "medical issues." R. 201,225-27. This ruling was correct. Potter had 
no medical training at all, but was instead a high school graduate who had taken 
some undefined community courses in the early 1970s. R. 126-32. Moreover, 
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Defendant has not directly challenged the trial court's qualification ruling on 
appeal. Given this failure, this claim should be rejected for this reason alone.6 
Second, Defendant also intended to have Potter testify about "the absorption 
rate of alcohol into a person's system" and "the expected blood alcohol level at the 
time of the actual operation of the vehicle by the Defendant." R. 134. Defendant 
subsequently argued that this testimony would have shown that regardless of what 
his blood alcohol test was at the time of the blood draw, it was not "above the legal 
limit at the time of his actual operation of the vehicle." R. 164. 
Although the trial court initially approved this testimony, it ultimately 
reconsidered and concluded that the proposed testimony would be irrelevant to this 
prosecution. R. 457:94. The court explained that since the State was only relying on 
§ 41-6a-502(l)(a), "any testimony that would be proffered or requested that would 
go to what [Defendant's] blood alcohol or breath alcohol concentration would have 
been at the time of the accident" would be "irrelevant." R. 457: 98-99. 
Defendant argues that this ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to 
present a defense. Aplt. Br. 25-33. But it is well-established that a defendant does 
6
 In any event, the forensic nurse who took the blood sample specifically 
testified that he had used a Betadine swab, rather than ethanol, so as to avoid 
introducing any alcohol-based product into Defendant's blood. R. 458: 90. 
Defendant points to no evidence in the record contradicting this claim. 
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not have a constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. To the contrary,"State 
and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules 
excluding evidence from criminal trials," and the Constitution therefore "permits 
judges to exclude evidence" that is irrelevant or even "marginally relevant." Homes 
v. South Carolina, 5^7 U.S. 319,324 (2006) (quotations and citation omitted); see also 
State v. Williams, 773 R2d 1368,1372-73 (Utah 1989) (holding that the defendant had 
no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence regarding a rape victim's prior 
sexual activity); State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,137 P.3d 726 (affirming a trial court's 
decision to exclude proposed expert testimony that would not have "aid[ed] the 
trier of fact in determining the factual questions before it"); State v. Clark, 2009 UT 
App 252, 219 P.3d 631; State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, If 26, 64 P.3d 1218 (holding 
that a trial court does not commit error by "exclud[ing] evidence relating to a 
defense that is no longer available"). 
Here, the trial court excluded the proposed testimony because of its 
determination that it would be irrelevant under a prosecution for violating Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a). R. 457: 98-99. That ruling was correct. 
"When interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of the statute 
and give effect to that language unless it is ambiguous. Thus, a statutory provision 
should be read literally, unless it would result in an unreasonable or inoperable 
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result." State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, If 7,217 P.3d 265. When separate provisions of a 
statute are at issue, courts interpret the provisions "in harmony" with each other. 
Id. at f 9. "In essence, statutes should be construed . . . so that no part or provision 
will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
As noted above, the statute provided three different ways for the State to 
prove that a defendant was driving while intoxicated. See generally Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6a-502(l)(a) to -(c). While Subsections -502(l)(a) and -502(l)(c) both involved 
blood alcohol testing, the plain language shows that these two subsections address 
very different problems. 
Under Subsection -502(1)(c), a person "may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person: (c) has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual physical 
control." (Emphasis added). And under Subsection -502(1)(a) —which is the 
provision at issue in this case —,"a person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle... if the person: (a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that 
a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test!' (Emphases added). 
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As noted by the added emphases, Subsection -502(1)(a) contains two 
significant differences from Subsection -502(1) (c). The first is that Subsection 
-502(l)(a) does not focus on the blood alcohol concentration at the time the 
defendant was operating the vehicle; rather, it only focuses on the blood alcohol 
concentration at the time of a "subsequent chemical test/' The second difference is 
that, unlike Subsection -502(l)(c), Subsection -502(l)(a) does not require that the 
alcohol have metabolized into the bloodstream at the time the defendant was 
driving the vehicle. To the contrary, Subsection -502(l)(a) expands the inquiry by 
allowing prosecution when there is "sufficient alcohol in the person's body/' such that 
the "subsequent chemical test" shows a concentration of .08 grams or greater "at 
the time of the test." 
These two subsections therefore address distinct problems. The difference is 
illustrated by the following scenarios: 
Scenario 1: A campus police officer observes a student consume several large 
alcoholic drinks at a party. Three hours later, the officer sees the student walk to her 
car and drive away. The officer noticed a slight tilt to her walking, so he pulls her 
over for a suspected DUI. After conducting an investigation, he obtains her 
permission for a blood draw. Analysis subsequently shows that her blood alcohol 
concentration at the time of the test was .785, but an analyst testifies that based on 
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blood alcohol absorption rates, the student's blood alcohol concentration would 
have been above .08 at the time she was operating the vehicle. If that testimony was 
accepted by the jury, this student would be guilty of violating Subsection -502(1 )(c), 
because her blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit while she was 
driving. 
Scenario 2: A campus police officer observes a student consume several large 
alcoholic drinks at a party, after which she immediately gets in her car and drives 
away. The officer pulls her over and obtains her permission for a blood draw. The 
forensic analysis subsequently shows that she had a blood alcohol concentration of 
.08 at the time of the test. But when blood alcohol absorption rates are factored in, 
the analyst also concludes that her blood alcohol levels had not yet reached .08 at 
the time of the stop itself. 
Under this scenario, the student would not be guilty under Subsection 
-502(l)(c), due to the fact that her blood alcohol concentration had not yet reached 
.08 while she was "operating the vehicle." But she would be guilty under 
Subsection -502(l)(a), due to the fact that she had "sufficient alcohol in [her] body" 
such that a "subsequent chemical test" showed that her blood alcohol concentration 
had risen to .08 grams or greater "at the time of the test." 
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Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, the State clearly has an interest in 
criminalizing both types of behavior. The purpose of the DUI statute is to prevent 
people from driving once they have consumed enough alcohol to become impaired. 
This not only applies to people who are already impaired, but also to those who are 
becoming progressively impaired due to alcohol that is currently metabolizing in 
their system. Thus, Subsection 502(1) (a) closes a potential loophole in the DUI 
structure. Without it, people who had drunk large amounts of alcohol would have 
an incentive to try driving home before their blood alcohol had metabolized and 
reached the legal limit. This subsection removes that incentive. 
More importantly for purposes of this case, the plain language of Subsection 
-502(1) (a) clearly forestalls a defense that is based on the blood alcohol concentration 
at the time of the operation of the vehicle. Instead, the only questions before a jury 
in a Subsection -502(l)(a) prosecution are: (1) whether the alcohol was in the 
defendant's body at the time of the stop, and (2) whether that alcohol resulted in a 
blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater at the time of the subsequent chemical 
test. 
Here, Defendant could have prevailed by disproving either of these elements. 
First, he could have attempted to show that the alcohol in his system at the time of 
the test was ingested after he operated the vehicle. But Defendant has never 
36 
claimed that he was drinking alcohol while being treated in the ER, and he never 
offered any testimony from a qualified expert to show that his medical treatment 
would have resulted in an elevated blood alcohol concentration. Second, Defendant 
could have also attacked the validity of the blood test itself, such as by claiming that 
the test procedures were flawed, or by instead pointing to a problem with the chain 
of custody. The trial court expressly allowed Defendant to do this, and Defendant 
therefore presented such evidence throughout the trial. R. 458: 78-83, (challenging 
the chain of custody on the blood sample), 92-98 (same), 141-43 (same), 148-50 
(same); R. 458:150-59 (challenging the accuracy of the blood testing). 
But given the limited nature of this prosecution, the State was not required to 
prove that Defendant's blood alcohol concentration was already .08 at the time he 
was operating his motorcycle. And even if Defendant had been able to prove that it 
had not yet reached that level, this would not have constituted a defense under 
Subsection -502(l)(a). Thus, the trial court was correct when it concluded that the 
proposed testimony regarding Defendant's blood alcohol concentration while he 
was driving was irrelevant. Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected. 
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III. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-6A-502(l)(a) IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Finally, Defendant argues that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502(l)(a) was 
unconstitutionally vague. Aplt, Br. 33-37. This claim should be rejected for three 
reasons. 
First, Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must support an argument" with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." To satisfy this rule, a 
party must offer more than ''just bald citation to authority/' State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rather, the 
party must also provide "development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based on that authority," id., thereby "plead[ing] his claims with sufficient 
specificity for this court to make a ruling on the merits." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 
1f 9,194 P.3d 903. In Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, f 16 n.5, 
122 P.3d 144, this Court accordingly refused to review a claim where the party had 
quoted from the statute and "cite[d] several cases," but still failed to "apply the 
statute and case law to the facts of this case." 
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Here, Defendant generally claims that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) is vague. Aplt. Br. 33-
37. But although he cites to several cases discussing vagueness, he makes little 
effort to apply the governing principles to this particular statute. For example, 
while Defendant acknowledges that a statute is only facially vague if it "is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications/' Aplt. Br. 34, he does not then argue, 
let alone demonstrate, that § 41-6a-502(l)(a) is vague in all of its applications. 
Similarly, while Defendant acknowledges that a statute is void for vagueness "if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined/' Aplt. Br. 35, he makes no effort to demonstrate 
why this statute's prohibitions are unclear. Given this, this Court should not 
consider this argument on its merits. 
Second, even if properly briefed, Defendant lacks standing to raise the claim. 
"[T]o establish standing to challenge [a statute on] vagueness [grounds], a 
defendant has the burden of proving the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ^ 44,100 P.3d 231 (quotations and 
citation omitted). A defendant who "engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed" by the statute cannot make that showing because, necessarily, the 
challenged statute is not impermissibly vague as applied to him. Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). In other words, a defendant who is not injured by a statute has no 
standing "to complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of 
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othei s." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). A court reviewing a defendant's 
standing to raise a vagueness challenge "should therefore examine the [defendant's] 
conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495. 
As discussed above, Subsection -502(1) (a) made it illegal for a person to 
"operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle . . . if the person has sufficient 
alcohol. . . thai a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test." Here, 
Defendant told Officer Jennings that he was driving his motorcycle at the time of the 
accident, R. 458: 36, and a subsequent test of Defendant's blood showed a blood 
alcohol concentration of .10. R. 458: 144. The jury accepted this evidence and 
convicted Defendant, and Defendant has not challenged that result on appeal for 
insufficiency of the evidence. Thus, Defendant has "engage[d] in some conduct that 
is clearly proscribed" by the statute, and he therefore lacks standing to challenge it 
for vagueness, \nsari, 2004 UT App 326, f^ 44 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Third, Defendant's claim fails on its merits. As noted above, Defendant does 
not specifically explain his vagueness theory, and a review of his motion below 
sheds little light on the specific nature of his claim. Aplt. Br. 33-37; R. 176-80. And 
although the parties argued this motion on May 9, 2008, R. 201, Defendant has not 
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requested a transcript of that hearing. Based on the trial court's subsequent ruling, 
however, it appears that Defendant's claim is that the statute is unconstitutional 
because it does not limit the time that can pass between the time of the driving and 
the time of the test. R. 200-01. If this is the claim, it fails. 
"'It is a basic principle that legislative enactments are endowed with a strong 
presumption of validity.'" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, f 10 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Therefore, "'[w]hen addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute, 
[this Court] presume[s] that the statute is valid and resolve[s] any reasonable doubts 
in favor of constitutionality.'" State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^ 6,128 P.3d 1223 
(quoting State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93,14,100 P.3d 1218); see also State v. Maguire, 2004 
UT 4, f 8, 84 P.3d 1171. This Court will strike a statute only if "'there is no 
reasonable basis upon which [it] can be construed as conforming to constitutional 
requirements.'" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326,110. 
"A statute is [unconstitutionally] vague if it either (a) 'fails to provide people 
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it 
prohibits' or (b) 'authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement/" Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ^ 42 (citation omitted); see also Maguire, 
2004 UT 4,1{ 13. "If a statute 'is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader 
what conduct is prohibited,' it is not unconstitutionally vague" under the first prong 
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of this test. Maguire, 2004 UT 4,114,84 P.3d 1171 (citation omitted). Similarly," [if] 
the meaning of the [provision] is readily ascertainable/' it is not unconstitutionally 
vague under the second prong of this test. Id. at ^ 32. 
As discussed above, the statutory provisions at issue here are clear. First, the 
alcohol must "be in the person's body" while operating the vehicle; and second, that 
alcohol must be "sufficient" to result in blood alcohol concentration above .08 as 
measured by a "subsequent chemical test." When reading this statute, a person of 
reasonable intelligence would understand that he cannot drink enough alcohol to 
reach the legal limit and then drive a car, regardless of whether his blood alcohol 
concentration has actually risen to .08 by the time of the stop. Thus, the plain 
language of Subsection -502(l)(a) "provide[s] 'the kind of notice that enables 
ordinary people to understand what conduct [is prohibited]." Maguire; 2004 UT 4, 
Tf 13 (citations omitted) (second set of brackets in original). 
Even if properly briefed, Defendant's vagueness challenge therefore fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUWTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENSON A. MANWARING, 
Defendant 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051402975 
Division 3: Judge Claudia Laycock 
Date: May 15,2007 
This matter comes before the court on the defendant's Motion 10 Suppress. Having heard 
oral arguments, received evidence, and reviewed the submitted memoranda and applicable case 
law, the court issues the following: 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. On December 14, 2005 a preliminary hearing wras conducted. At the conclusion of the 
preliminary hearing, the court bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of driving 
under the influence with prior convictions, a third-degree felony. 
2. The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of his Motion 
to Suppress on December 28, 2005. 
3. On March 9, 2006 the State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. 
O n '\ •*. * 
4. The court conducted a suppression hearing on October 11, 2006. During the hearing, 
testimony was received from the defendant, Officer Kreston Bascom, and Officer Joshua 
Jennings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court allowed the parties to file post-
hearing memoranda. 
5. The defendant filed his Post Hearing Memorandum on December 5, 2006. 
6. The state filed its Post Hearing Response to Defendant's Post Hearing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Suppress on March 1, 2007. 
7. The defendant filed a notice to submit on the motion on March 16, 2007. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 19th, 2005 at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Bascom of the Provo City Police 
Department responded to a traffic accident at the intersection of 1860 South and State 
Street in Provo, Utah. 
2. Officer Bascom performed the accident investigation and determined that it involved a 
motorcycle and an automobile. 
3. The defendant, Benson A. Manwaring, was the driver of the motorcycle. His fiance wras a 
passenger. Both sustained injuries and were attended to by medical personnel in separate 
ambulances. The defendant's leg was bleeding profusely. 
4. Officer Bascom first contacted the defendant in the ambulance, but not in conjunction 
with a DUI investigation. Officer Bascom does not remember speaking with the 
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defendant about any alcohol consumption. The defendant stated at this time that he was 
the driver of the motorcycle. 
5. Officer Bascom does not remember giving the defendant a portable breath test (PBT) and 
stated that he would have made a report of its administration if he had. Officer Bascom 
testified at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress that he never saw the PBT 
being administered. 
6. There is no PBT report from Officer Bascom. 
7. Upon arriving at the scene shortly thereafter, Officers Jennings observed "a black 
motorcycle in the northbound facing left turn lane on State Street, the south side of the 
intersection. I observed a little further south of that a Honda Accord with some air bags 
deployed." 
8. While asking Officer Jennings to obtain information from the drivers of the vehicles, 
Officer Bascom told Officer Jennings that he had smelled alcohol on the defendant's 
breath and indicated that he suspected a DUX. 
9. After finding the defendant in an ambulance, Officer Jennings asked the defendant who 
was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The defendant indicated that he 
was the driver. 
i 0. Officer Jennings also asked the defendant about the extent of his injuries. The defendant 
indicated his belief that Ms ankle was broken, but affirmatively asserted that he did not 
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have any head injuries. Officer Jennings further observed cuts and scrapes all over the 
defendant's legs and road rash on his hands. Officer Jennings testified that the 
paramedics did not believe that the defendant had sustained any head injury and did not 
see any signs of a head injury. 
11. As the officer spoke with the defendant, he noted a strong odor of alcohol emanating 
from the defendant. 
12. After speaking with the defendant, Officer Jennings returned to the motorcycle, identified 
it as a Yamaha, and observed that its front tire had been damaged. He further observed 
three 24-ounce vinopznzd ozn.s of beer on the ground close to the motorcycle. 
13. Officer Jennings told Officer Bascom that he would conduct the DUI portion of the 
investigation. 
14. At that time, the Provo City Police Department did not have enough portable breath 
testing devices (PBTs) for every officer to carry. None of the officers on the scene of the 
accident carried a PBT that night. At some point, one of the officers called for a PBT to 
be delivered to the scene. 
15. Approximately forty-five minutes after the accident, the medical team transported the 
defendant, via ambulance, to the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center (UVRMC). 
Officer Jennings told the defendant that he would meet him at the hospital. 
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16. Before going to the hospital, Officer Jennings stopped briefly at the police department to 
get a DUI citation form in order to read the DUI admonitions from the form. 
17. Officer Bascom went to the hospital briefly, but did not see the defendant. 
18. After arriving at the hospital, Officer Jennings asked the defendant if he would perform 
some sobriety tests. Officer Jennings never told the defendant that he would arrest him, if 
the defendant didn't submit to the PBT test. 
19. The defendant indicated that he would perform the tests. 
20. Because the defendant had leg injuries, Officer Jennings did not ask the defendant to 
perform the walk-and-tum test or the one-leg-stand test. 
21. Instead, Officer Jennings had the defendant perform only the horizontal-gaze nystagmus 
test (HGN). The officer observed nystagmus in both eyes at the maximum deviation. 
Based on this test, the officer believed that the defendant wras impaired above the per se 
level of .08 blood-alcohol content (3AC). 
22. Officer Jennings did not ask the defendant to perform the ABC test, the touch-the-nose 
test, or finger test because the Provo City Police Department did not recognize these tests 
as standardized field sobriety tests. Additionally, the officer indicated the defendant had 
road rash on his hands and the officer believed it would be difficult for the defendant to 
perform any tests with his hands. 
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23. Officer Jennings next asked the defendant to take a PBT. The defendant did not object 
and the officer administered the test. 
24. The PBT provided Officer Jennings with a digital readout of the defendant's blood 
alcohol level. The officer testified that although the test provided a digital readout and he 
recorded this digital readout of the defendant's blood alcohol content level, he had been 
instructed to ignore the specific number and to only look for a positive or negative 
outcome. 
25. The defendant did not personally calibrate the PBT, but understood that someone at the 
police department kept the PBTs calibrated and in working order. 
26. Officer Jennings placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
27. According to Officer Jennings, the defendant answered his questions appropriately, did 
not have bloodshot eyes, and did not have slurred speech — characteristics often 
associated with those under the influence of alcohol. 
28. Once Officer Jennings arrested the defendant, he asked the defendant if he would submit 
to a chemical test (blood test) to determine the alcohol content level of his blood. The 
defendant agreed to submit to this test and the officer read the DUI admonition pursuant 
to Utah Code Ami. §41-6a-520, Utah's implied consent law. 
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Next, the Officer Jennings gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and, subsequently, 
the defendant refused to answer any questions from the interview portion of the DUI 
form. 
Throughout the night, the defendant kept asking the officers if he was going to be 
arrested. Officer Jennings never told the defendant that he was going to jail, never 
brought the issue up, and testified that he had no intention of taking the defendant to jail, 
due to the extent of the defendant's injuries. The officer informed the defendant of his 
intentions and reasons. 
Officer Baseom testified that it was not his practice to tell people under investigation that 
they would go to jail if they did not take the PBT test. Therefore, Officer Baseom does 
not believe that he made any statement to the defendant which conditioned his staying out 
jail upon his taking the PBT test 
After the defendant continued to ask if he was going to jail, Officer Jennings finally told 
the defendant that "I'm investigating a DUI and I'll make that determination." 
Officer Jennings initially arrived at the hospital at 22:35 and placed the defendant under 
arrest at 22:40. He administered the HGN and PBT during the intervening five minutes. 
The defendant was released from the hospital around midnight. He was not taken to jail, 
but was picked up by his fiance's father. 
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35. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Jennings indicated that he told the defendant that he 
did not have to take the PBT. 
36, At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant testified that he began drinking Miller High Life 
beer at 1 p.m. He had approximately six beers by the time he stopped drinking at 
approximately 4 p.m. in the afternoon. His fiance came over to his house at 
approximately 9 p.m., and they left on the motorcycle together. He did not go anywhere 
else that afternoon, but stayed at his house. 
III. ANALYSIS 
At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant told the court that he would no longer be 
pursuing any Miranda issues, specifically suppression of answers the defendant made while he 
was in the ambulance, because the defendant agreed that the defendant was not in custody at that 
time. Additionally, the defendant agreed that further questions of custody were not at issue and 
that he was not in custody until he was placed under arrest at the hospital. 
A. Credibility Issues 
At the preliminary hearing, several of the facts presented by the defendant differed greatly 
from those presented by the officers. Of particular importance to the instant matter are those 
concerning who administered the PBT and when it wras administered. The defendant believed 
that Officer Bascom—and not Officer Jennings-administered the test in the ambulance before the 
defendant was taken to the hospital. Officer Bascom does not recollect administering the test nor 
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seeing the test administered at any time. Additionally, Officer Bascom does not report 
administering the PBT in his report. 
However, Officer Jennings has a clear recollection that he administered the test at the 
hospital and remembers several details surrounding his asking the defendant to take the test. 
Additionally, he was the officer assigned to investigate the DUI, while Officer Bascom 
investigated the accident itself. Officer Jennings remembers being with the defendant at the 
hospital, while Officer Bascom does not recollect going to the hospital at all, although dispatch 
logs show that he may have been there briefly. Therefore, the court adopts the officer% version 
of the facts surrounding the administration of the HGN and the PBT, finding their testimony to 
be more reliable. Furthermore, the defendant himself testified at the evidentiary hearing that the 
HGN was administered at the hospital. It is only logical that the HGN and the PBT would have 
been administered at the same time. Finally, the defendant had been drinking during the day and 
had been injured in the accident, while the officers were quite sober and uninjured. 
B. Accuracy of PBT 
The defendant argued that the portable breath test administered by Officer Jennings was 
"inaccurate and illegal." The defendant, however, did not address any inaccuracies of the PBT's 
operation in his arguments. Neither has the defendant attempted to carry his burden of rebutting 
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the presumption that the equipment was functioning properly as required by U.C.A. §41-6a-515. 
Therefore, the court does not address that accuracy of the PBT.1 
C. Actual Consent 
The defendant bases his motion to suppress on his argument that the officers required to 
him to submit to a pre-arrest chemical test in violation of U.C. A. §41-6a-520, the implied 
consent law governing chemical testing of blood-alcohol-content levels. The defendant argues 
that, because the PBT provided and Ofncer Jennings recorded a digital readout of the defendant's 
blood-alcohol-content level, the PBT should be considered a chemical test and not a field 
sobriety test. Therefore, the implied-eonsent statute should have been followed by Officer 
Jennings in administering the test. Because the officer failed to read the defendant the DUI 
admonitions as required by the statute, the defendant claims that ail subsequently obtained 
evidence (specifically the blood draw) should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. Additionally, the defendant claims that, because the PBT should be considered a 
chemical test, the implied-consent statute requires the state to meet a higher standard when 
}This court is also of the belief that U.C.A. §41-6a-515 does not apply to PBT devices, as 
this statute was enacted long before the appearance and use of PBTs in DUI investigations. The 
legislature did not enact this statute with the PBT in mind. Furthermore, the coun is aware of no 
Utah appellate cases which have found that the PBT has satisfied the requirements of Rule 702 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence and its analysis under State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) 
and its progeny. In addition, the officer's testimony was that he has been trained to use the PBT 
result to advise him as to the presence or absence of alcohol in the DUI suspect's blood. He does 
not rely upon the result to advise him of the BAC, as a certified intoxilyzer would. This court 
views the PBT as nothing more than a field sobriety test, akin to the HGN, the one-leg stand, and 
the walk-and-turn tests. 
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establishing that the defendant actually consented to the administration of the PBT. The 
defendant also argues that the constitutional standards for administering the PBT require peace 
officers to first obtain objective and probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the 
influence before requiring a breath sample. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §41-6A-520, the legislature implemented the following: 
(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, 
blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining whether the person was 
operating or in actual control of the vehicle... 
(2)(a) A peace officer requesting a test or tests shall warn a person that 
refusal to submit to the test or tests may result in revocation of the person's 
license to operate a motor vehicle, a five or ten-year prohibition of driving with 
any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the person's body depending 
on the person's prior driving history, and a three-year prohibition of driving 
without an ignition interlock if the person: (I) has been placed under arrest; (2) has 
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the 
chemical tests under subsection (1); and (iii) refuses to submit to any chemical 
test requested. 
Therefore, if the court determines that the PBT is a chemical test, then implied consent 
law is applicable, but only if the test is offered after arrest; otherwise, the defendant's actual 
consent must be given. State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1968)("[A] person prior to arrest 
has not given his implied consent to a chemical test and, therefore, his actual consent must be 
given."); See also, In Interest of R.LI, 111 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989)(Pre-arrest cases require proof 
of actual consent); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Although the language of the code limits its application to post-arrest administration of 
chemical tests, the defendant relies on language in State v. Cruz to support his argument that the 
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implied-consent statute requires the DUI admonitions to be given to a defendant before consent 
is deemed voluntary. Consequently, the defendant argues that allowing a pre-arrest PBT without 
requirmg a high standard of voluntariness is unconstitutional, as it would allow peace officers to 
detain any citizen at any time to obtain breath samples without probable cause. Such use of the 
PBT would allow peace officers to get around the protections set up to ensure the admission of 
proper post-arrest breath samples at trial. 
The defendant argues that the higher standard of voluntariness which should be used in 
the instant case was set forth in State v. Webb: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the 
courts indulge eveiy reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were 
waived. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The court rejects the defendant's argument that the implied consent statute requires a 
higher standard of voluntariness before a defendant can be deemed to have consented to taking 
the PBT. The language in State v. Cruz relied on by the defendant is inapplicable in the instant 
case. It is true that the Cruz court rejected the 
"[sjtate's contention that the driver of an automobile, because of the implied 
consent law, must submit to a test prior to arrest, but not after. [Adopting the 
state's contention] would result in the anomalous situation of an arrested person 
being afforded more rights than one not under arrest. The legislature could not 
have intended such result. 
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446 P.2d 307, 308 (1968)(emphasis added). However, Cruz dealt only with the circumstance 
where officers administered the chemical test over the objections of the defendant who was not 
arrested at the time of the tests. Cruz determined that the implied consent could not be gleaned 
from a pre-arrest defendant, but required that "his actual consent must be given." Id., at 309. 
Nothing in Cruz increased the standard of voluntariness as applied to the administration of pre-
arrest chemical tests. 
Further, the heightened consent standard enunciated by Webb has been specifically 
rejected by Utah's Supreme Court. In State v. Bisner, the court specifically removed the third 
prong, requiring an affirmative waiver of rights, from the voluntariness determination. 37 P.3d 
1073, 1088 (Utah 2001). Rather, the court provided the following test: 
When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given 
voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly 
applied since [the United State's Supreme Court decision in] Schneckloth: 
Consent is not voluntary if it obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, 
express or implied. Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion, which should 
be assessed in the 'totality of all the surrounding circumstances,' include: 1) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by 
the owner of the property; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer. 
Id.; See also, State v. Humphrey, 138 P.3d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
Therefore, the application of a higher standard of voluntariness is inappropriate in 
determining whether the defendant voluntarily acquiesced to performing the PBT. In looking at 
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the totality of the circumstances as required under Eisner, the court finds that the defendant 
voluntarily consented to the administration of the PBT. 
i. Absence of claim of authority. Officer Jennings did not extricate the defendant's 
cooperation with the test through any means of duress or coercion. Although Officer Jennings 
met the defendant at the hospital, he asked the defendant to consent immediately upon his 
arrival at the hospital, administered the tests within five minutes of his arrival, and remained 
with the defendant only after the HGN and the PBT positively affirmed his suspicions that the 
defendant wras driving under the influence. His prior contact with the defendant in the 
ambulance cannot be considered a show of authority, as he was simply gathering information 
from the defendant concerning the accident. 
ii. Absence of exhibition of force by the officers: The court finds that Officer Jennings 
did not obtain consent from the defendant by showing force. During the entire time that Officer 
Jennings interacted with the defendant, he never displayed any weapons or physical sign of 
force. Although a number of officers were milling around the scene of the accident, the number 
was reasonable considering that an accident had just occurred. None, including Officer Bascom, 
displayed their weapons or made any forceful display towards the defendant. Only Officer 
Bascom and Officer Jennings approached the defendant. Furthermore, at the time the request 
was made of the defendant at the hospital, the defendant recalls only seeing Officer Jennings, 
and Officer Jennings recalls being there without other officers in the room. 
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iii. Mere request to search: According to Officer Jennings, he simply asked the 
defendant if he could administer the HGN and the portable breath test. Although the defendant 
was afraid that he would go to jail, this fear was not prompted by Officer Jennings. Officer 
Jennings did not bring up the issue of jail and indicated that he had no intention of taking the 
defendant to jail due to his injuries. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Jennings further 
indicated that he told the defendant that he would not be going to jail. At some point and after 
being petitioned several times by the defendant, Officer Jennings responded to the defendant 
that it was up to Officer Jennings to determine whether the defendant went to jail. The court 
does not find that this statement is sufficiently coercive to compel the defendant to take the PBT 
at risk of going to jail. The officer's failure to remember at the evidentiary hearing that he 
affirmatively told the defendant he would not go to jail is not significant to the court, based on 
the extended lapse of time between the two hearings. 
iv. Cooperation by the defendant: It appears that the defendant fully cooperated and 
agreed to take the PBT. Nothing has been presented by way of evidence to suggest that he 
refused or voiced his refusal to take the PBT. 
v. Absence of deception or nick on the part of the officer: There is nothing in the 
evidence presented to show that the officer tricked or deceived the defendant into taking the 
PBT. 
Therefore, the court finds that the defendant voluntarily consented to the administration 
of the PBT and the evidence produced from the PBT should not be suppressed. Neither State v. 
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Webb nor the implied-consent statute require a heightened standard of consent as to the 
implementation of the PBT test. 
D. Probable Cause 
Additionally, even if the court did exclude the PBT findings, the court finds that 
sufficient probable cause existed for the defendant to be arrested and the subsequent chemical 
blood test to be administered. In State v. Kinne, the Utah Appeals Court found that where ail 
breath test results were excluded, evidence did not support a finding of probable cause where: 
"(1) [the defendant] was stopped for speeding; (2) he had slow and slurred speech; (3) he 
admitted to having two beers; (4) the smell of alcohol emanated from his person; and (5) he 
performed three mconclusive field sobriety tests." 2001 UT App 373, ^3 (unpublished decision). 
Although the evidence in this case is similar to that presented in Kinne, it rises to a level 
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Although the defendant did not have slow and 
slurred speech, he had a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, three unopened 24 
ounce beer cans were found by his motorcycle, and he completely failed the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test approximately forty-five minutes after the accident occurred. Due to his injuries, 
the defendant was unable to perform any of the other standardized field sobriety tests. The court 
does not find it relevant that the officer did not have the defendant perform the ABC test or the 
finger count test, as the officer testified that these are not accepted field sobriety tests by Provo 
City Police Department. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. The state 
shall prepare the appropriate order and submit it for the court's signature. 
Dated this 15th day of May, 2007, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 15th day of May, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULING ON DEPENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to be delivered to the 
following parties: 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
100 East Center Street, #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
RANDALL GAITHER 
159 West 300 South Broadway #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clerk 
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72 FR 71480-02, 2007 WL 4368561 (F.R.) 
NOTICES 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Highway Safety Programs 
[Docket No. NHTSA-2007-0028] 
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Alcohol Measurement Devices 
Monday, December 17, 2007 
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT. 
"71480 ACTION: Notice. 
SUMMARY: This notice updates the Conforming Products List (CPL) published in the Federal Register on June 29, 2006 (71 
FR 371593 for instruments that conform to the Mpdel_Specifications for Evidential Breath Testing Devices (58_.FR 
487Q5). 
DATES: Effective Date: December 17, 2007. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Ms. De Carlo Ciccel, Behavioral Research Division, NTI-
131, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590; Telephone; 
(202) 366-1694. For legal issues: Ms. Allison Rusnak, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC-113, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590; Telephone: (202) 366-1834. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On November 5,1973, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
published the Standards for Devices to Measure Breath Alcohol (38 FR 30459). A Qualified Products List of Evidential 
Breath Measurement Devices comprised of instruments that met this standard was first issued on November 21,1974 (39 FR 
On December 14,1984 (4Q FR 48854), NHTSA converted this standard to Model Specifications for Evidential Breath 
Testing Devices (Model Specifications), and published a Conforming Products List (CPL) of instruments that were found 
to conform to the Model Specifications as Appendix D to that notice (49 FR 48864). 
On September 17,1993, NHTSA published a notice to amend the Mode] Specifications (58 FR 48705) and update the CPL. 
That notice changed the alcohol concentration levels at which instruments are evaluated, from 0.000, 0.050, 0.101, and 
0.151 BAC, to 0.000, 0.020, 0.040, 0.080, and 0.160 BAC. These devices are identified on the CPL with an asterisk. 
Additionally, that notice includes a test for the presence of acetone and an expanded definition of "71481 alcohol to include 
other low molecular weight alcohols; e.g., methyl or isopropyl. Thereafter, NHTSA has periodically updated the CPL with 
those breath instruments found to conform to the Model Specifications. The most recent update to the CPL was published 
June 29, 2006 (71 FR 37159). 
The CPL published today adds 6 instruments that have been evaluated and found to conform to the Model Specifications, as 
amended on September 17,1993, for mobile and non-mobile use. In alphabetical order by company, they are: 
(1) Intoxilyzer 240 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter 400+, outside U.S.) manufactured by CMI, Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky. This is a 
handheld device intended for use in stationary or roadside operations. It uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by 5 "AA" 
batteries. 
(2) The "Alcotest 9510" manufactured by Draeger Safety, Inc., Durango, Colorado. This is a bench-top device intended for 
use in a stationary setting. It is AC-powered and has dual sensors. The Alcotest 9510 uses both a fuel cell sensor and a 9-
micron infra-red type sensor to measure mouth alcohol. 
(3) The "AlcoQuant 6020" manufactured by EnviteC by Honeywell GmbH, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. This is a handheld 
device intended for use in stationary or roadside operations. It uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by 4 "AA" batteries. 
(4) The "EC-IR-II (Enhanced with serial numbers above 10,000)" manufactured by Intoximeters, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri. 
This is a bench-top, dual sensor device intended for stationary operations, and it is AC powered. This EC-IR-II uses a fuel cell 
sensor to determine breath alcohol concentration. The device also uses an infra-red type sensor to screen for mouth alcohol. 
The original EC-IR-II design was modified to incorporate additional test memory capacity, additional hardware to allow 
recirculation of a wet bath simulator, and enhanced EMC and RFI immunity. This model with the enhancements has an 
external and internal printer production option available. 
(5) The "Phoenix 6.0" manufactured by Lifeloc Technologies, Inc., Wheat Ridge, Colorado. This is a handheld device that 
uses a fuel cell sensor and is powered by an internal battery. It is intended for stationary or roadside operations. The Phoenix 
6.0 has the same core electronics, fuel cell, pump, and algorithms as the Lifeloc EV30. Enhancements of the Phoenix 6.0 
include high resolution display, wireless printing, barometric pressure sensor (to assist with dry gas calibrations), and Easy 
Mode™ software to guide the user through the DOT testing protocol. 
(6) The "ALC-PRO II (US)", manufactured by Tokai-Denshi, Inc., Tokyo, Japan. This device is a handheld battery-powered 
breath tester with a fuel cell sensor. The breath tester is connected to a 10.5" by 7.5" by 5" AC powered analytical unit. It is 
intended for stationary or roadside operations. 
The CPL has been updated to include the six instruments identified above. 
In accordance with the foregoing, the CPL is therefore updated, as set forth below 
Conforming Products List of Evidential Breath Measurement Devices 
Manufacturer and model 
Alcohol Countermeasure Systems Corp, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada: 
Alert J3AD[FN*] 
Alert J4X.ec 
PBA3000C 
BAC Systems, Inc., Ontario, Canada: 
Breath Analysis Computer[FN*] 
CAMEC Ltd., North Shields, Tyne and Ware, England: 
IR Breath Analyzer[FN*] 
CMI, Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky: 
Intoxilyzer Model: 
200 
200D 
240 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter 400+ outside the U.S.) 
300 
400 
400PA 
1400 
40ii[FN*] 
40iiA[FN*] 
40iiAS[FN*] 
40iiAS-A[FN*] 
40iiAS-AQ[FN*] 
4011 AW[FN*] 
40iiA27-ioioo[FN*] 
4011A27-10100 with filter[FN*] 
5000 
5000 (w/Cal Vapor Re-Circ.) 
5000 (w/ 3/8" ID Hose option) 
5000CD 
5000CD/FG5 
5000EN 
5000 (CAL DOJ) 
5000VA 
8000 
PAC 1200[FN*] 
S-D2 
S-D5 (aka: Lion Alcolmeter SD-5 outside the U.S.) 
Draeger Safety, Inc. (aka: National Draeger) Durango, Colorado: 
Alcotest Model: 
6510 
6810 
70io[FN*] 
7iio[FN*] 
7110 MKIII 
7110 MKIII-C 
7410 
7410 Plus 
Mobile 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Nonmobile 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
95io 
Breathalyzer Model: 
900 
900A[FN*] 
900BG[FN*] 
7410 
7410-II 
EnviteC by Honeywell GmbH, Fond du Lac, Wisconsin: 
AlcoQuant 6020 
Gall's Inc, Lexington, Kentucky: 
Alcohol Detection System-AD.S. 500 
Guth Laboratories, Inc., Hamsburg, Pennsylvania: 
Alcotector BAC-100 
Alcotector C2H50H 
Intoximeters, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri: 
Photo Electric Intoximeter[FN*] 
GC Intoximeter MK II[FN*] 
GC Intoximeter MK IV[FN*] 
Auto Intoximeter[FN*] 
Intoximeter Model: 
3000 
3000 (rev Bi)[FN*] 
3000 (rev B2)[FN*] 
3000 (rev B2A)[FN*] 
3000 (rev B2A) w/FM option[FN*] 
3000 (Fuel Cell)[FN*] 
3000 D[FN*] 
3000 DFC[FN*] 
Alcomonitor 
Alcomonitor CC 
Alco-Sensor III 
Alco-Sensor III (Enhanced with Serial Numbers above 1,200,000) 
Alco-Sensor IV 
Alco-Sensor IV-XL 
Alco-Sensor AZ 
Alco-Sensor FST 
EC/IR 
EC/IR II 
EC/IR II (Enhanced with serial number 10,000 or higher) 
Portable EC/IR II 
RBT-AZ 
RBT-III 
RBTIII-A 
RBTIV 
RBT IV with CEM (cell enhancement module) 
Komyo Kitagawa, Kogyo, K.K., Japan: 
Alcolyzer DPA-2[FN*] 
Breath Alcohol Meter PAM ioiB[FN*] 
Lifeloc Technologies, Inc., (formerly Lifeloc, Inc.), Wheat Ridge, Colorado: 
PBA 3000B 
PBA 3000-P[FN*] 
PBA 3000C 
Alcohol Data Sensor 
Phoenix 
Phoenix 6.0 
EV30 
FC10 
FC20 
Lion Laboratories, Ltd., Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom: 
Alcolmeter Model: 
300 
400 
400+ (aka: Intoxilyzer 240 in the U.S.) 
SD-2[FN*] 
SD-5 (aka: S-D5 in the U.S.) 
EBA[FN*] 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Intoxilyzer Model: 
200 
200D 
1400 
5000 CD/FG5 
5000 EN 
Luckey Laboratories, San Bernardino, California: 
Alco-Analyzer Model: 
iooo[FN*] 
2000[FN*] 
National Patent Analytical Systems, Inc., Mansfield, Ohio: 
BAC DataMaster (with or without the Delta-i accessory) 
BAC Verifier DataMaster (w/ or without the Delta--1 accessory) 
DataMaster cdm (w/ or without the Delta-i accessory) 
DataMaster DMT 
Omicron Systems, Palo Alto, California: 
Intoxilyzer Model: 
40ii[FN*] 
40iiAW[FN*] 
Plus 4 Engineering, Minturn, Colorado: 
5000 Plus 4[FN*] 
Seres, Paris, France: 
Alco Master 
Alcopro 
Siemans-Allis, Cheriy Hill, New Jersey: 
Alcomat[FN*] 
Alcomat F[FN*] 
Smith and Wesson Electronics, Springfield, Massachusetts: 
Breathalyzer Model: 
900[FN*] 
900A[FN*] 
iooo[FN*] 
200o[FN*] 
2000 (non-Humidity Sensor)[FN*] 
Sound-Off, Inc., Hudsonville, Michigan: 
Alco Data 
Seres Alco Master 
Seres Alcopro 
Stephenson Corp: 
Breathalyzer 900 [FN*] 
Tokai-Denshi Inc., Tokyo, Japan: 
ALC-PRO II (US) 
U.S. Alcohol Testing, Inc./Protection Devices, Inc., 
Alco-Analyzer 1000 
Alco-Analyzer 2000 
Alco-Analyzer 2100 
Verax Systems, Inc., Fairport, New York: 
BAC Verifier[FN*] 
BAC Verifier Datamaster 
BAC Verifier Datamaster H[FN*] 
, Rancho Cucamonga, California: 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
FN*Instruments marked with an asterisk (*) meet the Model Specifications detailed in 49 FR 48854 (December 14, 
1984) (i.e., instruments tested at 0.000, 0.050, 0.101, and 0.151 BAC.) Instruments not marked with an asterisk meet 
the Model Specifications detailed in 58 FR 48705 (September 17,1993), and were tested at BACs = 0.000, 0.020, 0.040, 
0.080, and 0.160. All instruments that meet the Model Specifications currently in effect (dated September 17,1993) also 
meet the Model Specifications for Screening Devices to Measure Alcohol in Bodily Fluids. 
(Authority: 23USC403: 49 CFR150; 49 CFR Part 501). 
Marilena Amoni, 
Associate Administrator for the Office of Research and Program Development. 
[FRDoc. 07-6040 Filed 12-14-07; 8:45 am] 
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